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THE CRISIS OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY(*)




Democracy means govemment by thc people, or, more spccifically, by rcpre_
sentatives electcd by popular majorities in fiee and competitive electiors (l ). The ,lif-
ticullics that Turkiih dcmocracy still faces are well illustratcd by the pcriodic inter,
vcntions of the armed tbrces at roughly ten-year inte als in 1960-1961, in 1971_
1973, and recently in 1980-1983.
Tlrc question why democracy brcke down again in Septembcr l?, 1980 may
bc assumed at differett levels. But before attempting to understand this evert. il sho_
uld be notcd that whetlevet Turkislr democracy has broken down. it has nof been su-
pcrscded by an authoritarian and totalitarian rejim" (2). Yet th"re is a fundameutal
contasl bclwecn these tclnlErary interventiorN in Turkcy alrd the long-tcrm inteflen-
tions by lhe military in otlrer Thitd World or Mcditcffanean countrics such as Korca.
tlrc Philippincs. Argentina. Brazil h dre l96os. Clrile in the l97os, Egypr in Nasser pe-
riod. Spain in Franco period or the Clonels'Junta in Greece (3).
Many years ago, the father of modem Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Aratii.rk, enun-
ciatcd an important veriry.He obscrved about the new national state he was bringirrg
into being: "Wc resemble ourselvc. '(4). By that ,"hc did not intend to irnply that Turks
are inherently different ironl othcr peoples.or that the rules ofpolitical behavior in the
world at large did not operate in Turkey.But he was calling attention to fte fact that
Turkish political experience wa-s no carbon copy of that oi other satr" (5) . Fullorni,rg
Mustafa Kemal's lead.one should bc especially cautious idendrying Turkish political
practice with models dtawn from other societies and other times.
The product of Turkish history, the changing mnstellarion of inrernational
pressues, the impact of personality. and sheer chance combine to impart a uniqueness
that cannot be completely comprehended in the shonhand of analogy to othe! countri-
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es. There is some discussion on the Tukish Constitution that it beals a resemblance to
some Eurcpean countries-such as the Weimar Republic(German Republic) or the
French example 
(6). No matter how much the frarners of the current constitutional
system may have borrowed from European examples, Turkey today is far ftom re-
sembling any of the various examples or any other external sources of inspiration.
Is Turkey a democracy? Is there 8 retum to real democracy in Turkey or what
are the factors which make TurKsh democracy into what it is? It is not easy to answer
these questions. However, we would like to explain lhe causcs of the crisis in the Tur-
kish democaacy, the role of the military in political life and the creation of a new Cons-
titution. We hope that answers to thete questions are inherent in the explanations.
The Emergence of Polarization and Fragmentation
In facl, the dilemmas drat Turkish politics went tlEough since 1945 arc t)?ical
of tlre pradoxes of the democratic fomr ofgovernment. Accotdilg to Ergiidcr, they
arise ftom tlre fact that a viable democracy slrould irvolve a successful blend of maxi-
mum amoult of congent on the hand and tlre need for coercion to pedorm the basic
tasks of govemment on the otlrer 0). He stated that "lhis critical balance between
conscent and coercion is more paradoxical in tlre case of developinS countries which
desperately need effective govemmental leadcrship and effectiveness to transform
their socicties and economics while at tlre same lime trying to build a dcmocracy ba-
sed on consent as broadly based as possible"(8),
In each breakdown of democracy in Turkey during the past 45 years these
contradictions or paradoxes of democracy were much in evidence. Inl960 the democ-
ratic system collapsed because conflict betveen political pafiies had been very polari-
zed and dre mode ofdealing with this polarizatioi was majoritarian authoritarianism
in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). Between 1961 and 1980, the cons-
titutional ftamework and dre elecloral sysiem acted a broad-based representative par-
lianent. What was lacking was the conscnsus needed to make coalilions work in a
very ftagrnented TGNA (9). As Ergilder stated that:
The attenvt bJ the military to restruclure theTurkish Political System aftcr
the Intemention of 1980 aimed at minimizing pdilicol conjilicl tltrough constitutio-
nal ata4genenls und by atcluding elements in tha party slstcn lhat v,ere ass<rialed
with conJlictual style of politics.This nteant the ettclusion of political parties with
ideological or ani-slstenic appeal as well as leaders of major parties u'hich wete
lhoughl to be rcsponsible fot the failute of ,hc potq slsten lo produce effective go-
vemttend leadership in a fragne6ted porliatrcnr . Depolarizaliory was and is a fa-
vorite term d daJ-to-dal Turkish politics of the 80s to desctibe thc political philo-
soptry of Septenbe, t2 thqo).
l8
The rccent Turkish experiance shows how a liberal and democratic system
can brcakdown, and how perhaps it may be revived. With the greater protection for
freedoms contained in the 1961 Constitution, the Turkish political system was more
liberal and democratic in fonn. In the Turkish case ,custom.prejudice and long estab-
lised economic and social conneclions influenced voting. and other expressions ofpo_
litical interest, more than in most of the liberal democracies of the Westem World.
Every liberal -demodatic political system requires resporNible but positive political
leadership in the general i[trest. The danger from the polidcal elites in this regard is
Llrat they have a tendency eitlrer to be corupted by an excessive pre-occupation with
intrests, or to be carricd away with ideological rhetoric ( 1l).
The Turkish system does not produce an elite able to maintain itself in office
for vcry long periods. The influence of pany members is paramount and rhe devicc of
prima.ries for dre election of candidates to run in thc geueral elections help enhance the
influence of parry official lower down in the hierarchy. What a responsible democra-
tic leadership musl do is to produce realistic but crcative policies alrd put them lumly
into effect when in office 
(12). 
In the Turkish case. temptalion of short-term parry ga-
ins is morc irnportant dran long-telm responsible and responsive !o demands of polici-
ln libcral democracy, the military, lie educational system and even the admi-
nisuative of the law assumes itnportanl rolcs. It is vital to have a bweaucracy whose
membcrs actually trelieve in libcral and democratic nonns. though the obstacles in tlre
way of achieving such a desinble condition are enormous. The perfecl civil servant
for a libcral and dernocratic political system in only going to be found in utopia, but
the great dangcr of a politicized bureaucracy needs to be guarded against at the price of
othcr disadvartagcs. That the bureaucracy should provide a measure of leadership it a
liberal dcmocracy even with regard (13).
For Turkey, the polarization of the burcaucracy was a real danger in recent
political life . It has, still, a polarized characler and a tighrly organized cenhally direc-
tcd institution (14)-
The Military and Politics
The institution which has advanced iself most as the champion ofthe public
interest in Turkey, if in very broad tenns has to be the military, often dubbed the "guar-
dian of Turkish dernocracy" (15).
Paradoxical though it may se€m, there is no doubt that this authoritarian insti-
tution has fulfilled this function both in 1960 and in 1971 and againin 1980.
However, on all thlee occassions tlle military have intewened to set up a dicta-
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torship intended only for a limited period until some modified fonn of liberal and de-
mocratic system might be made to work once mole. According to Dodd "dre language
of'collapse' or 'breakdown' rather suggest a marked contrasl between democratic lule
on the one hand and military rule on the odrer a black and white conrast lhat is too
sharp for the Turkish state 
(16).
He added that " al least since 1961 Turkish politics has always been under the
scrutiny of the military I it has not been Particularly the case since 1971. Thc role of dre
National Secu ty Council (NSC) with its substantial military membcrship has of late
years been enha ced. Thc nrilitary has nken upon itself tlrc dury of offerilrg advice and
has delivered stiff warniig as soon as the political situation has shown signs ofSetting
out of hand." 
(17)
Role of the Military in Turkish History
The military have pliycd a signiftcanl role in Turkish culture and polirics his-
torically. In the most gcneral selse, thc Turks have inherited Muslirn culture which re-
cogrizes and accepts the le gilinacy of the military as alr arm of the Islanric Cornmu-
niry. Hepcr aDd Taclrau loted ihal" the military played a key role in thc establishmenl
ofthc Onoma]r Empire. Thc mililary continucd lo fi8ure prominclrtly lluou8hout Ot-
toman hislory. Not only was lhc Sultan exPccted to marrifesl miliIary prowess and
physical courage anlong olhcr royal attribules, but also thc elite Jarissary Corp's occu-
pied an important posilion in the imperial snu",*"."(18)
That is . the enpirc rclied ulnn drc army which Played a fundamcntal role nol
only in dre economic orgurizatiolr based lugely on conquest. However, for dre purpo-
se of underslanding lhe currelrt posilion ofihe Turkish military establishrnent. linle is
to bc gained by looking at the Otbman expelience before the lalt$ ninctccnfi century.
The guardian rolc of the officer corps as an honored calling ran as a basic thre-
ad througlr all Ottouran a|d modem Turkish history. This altirudc ofrespecl tbr a con-
fiderrce in tfie nrilitary conmaudcrs was in tccent times to uDdcrline their inclitration
to intervenc when t-hey saw titeats to the state arld to condition popular acceptance of a
military move.
By the end of the 19 $ cenhrry, liberal reformist ideas lud permeated the mili-
taly offi"", ..op, (19). The military played an important if somewhat indirect rcle in
the upheavals of the early 20 th century beginning with the so-called Young Turk revo-
luation of 1908 and continuing tluough World war I (20). Th"y prouided the example
of military action against constituted authority on behalfof the Young Turk period
were mixed. They set no clear limits on military engagement in politics (21).
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In terms ofthe connection of officers with political panies, the young Turk
experience provided a compellinB example for Atatiirk to follow. Officers were the
core of the Committe of Union and hogress even though civilians played a continuing
major part in ris seminal political involvement with civilian leaden was vital in nou_
rishing the concept that the officers were rcsponsible for the destiny ofthe state.
The new Republican army becamc ill fact the first insititution ofthe nascenl
TurkNh state evcn though it was fornrally relegated by Mustafa Kemal to semndary
place with respcct to the parliamenl alrd esfJecially the party. As Hcpcr and Tachau gr
inted out lhat:
One of the intportant aspects of the so.called Kenulist regine was the at-
Ienvl onthe part of Mustafa Kendlto separ.ue the nilitary fro tlrc ordinary con-
duct ofpollitical affairs. In addiliotl lo his public stalcnanls al this poinr, lE took ofli_
cial uction fu persuadi g thc Parli.tncnt to fotbid nititary oJficcrs to sterld for elec-
tion unless thc! resignert tleir cortntissions.(22)
According to Heper. the ain ofthis frolicy was not only to prevent the military
frorn cxercising direct political influencc. but also to insulate the military eslablish_
mcnt from the pulling and hauling oftlrc poliri"ul *"n" (23). Thi. i., h fact, chaiacle-
ristic ofstablc political .egi,rr"* (24). On rhe other hand, it is noteworthy that channels
of influence over the military were carefully preserved tltroughout thc hrst three deca-
des of Kemalist Republican rule (roughly 1920 - rhrough 1950).
A major factor in preserving stable relations berween the military and civilan
leadership was the military background of tle top tigures involved: Musufa Kemal
himselfas hesident ofthe Republic untilhis death late in 1938 and Ismet lndnti, suc_
cessor to Mustafa Kernal was assurcd of military suppn fbr his far,reaching reform
pro8rafi. By the same token. drc military was assured of lieedom from partisan pohli-
cal interference ir thei affai$ as well as having acccss !o lhe highesr authorilies of the
state.
A maicr clunge in the Tukish political system occured in 1950, whcn the 27-
year reign of rhe Republican People's Party (RPP) was brouglrt to an end by a stunnilg
electoral victory won by the break-away Democrat Party (DP) under leadership of Ce-
lal Bayar and Adnan M"nd"r". (25).
Heper and Tachau noted that " the victory of the Democrats did not occur in a
vacuum. It was the expression and the result of deepsealed social and economic devc-
lopments. Primary among these was the rise of a class of middle-class enterpreneus
and businessman in place of the non-muslirn mirorities who had fulfiled these functi-
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ons in $e Ottoman Emp;e 
(26). Tley aaded that " the yean ofRepublican rule had
produced an unprecendented era of peace for the Turkish people, bringing rising stan-
darts of living and the beginnings of industrialization and commercialization of the
,.a:7t
economy.
Consequently, a military career was no longer the only channel for upward
rnobiliry. The proportion ofex-rnilitary officers arnong the political elite (i.c.. ilr parli-
arnent and cabinet) declined 
(28). 
Ind""d, the twin pillan of the Kemalist regime ( the
military and civil bureaucracy) rcceded in power and significance during the decade
of the 1950;, overshadowed by the commercial eenterpreneus and businessmen as
well as segments ofprovincial and regional elites, These groups became the core of
suppon for the DP\-''.
ln addition. the expendcd educational facilities of dre Republican era opcned
up altemative career avenues for upward mobiliry, particularly in the professions.
What is more, in dre inflation which developed under the Dcmocrats ambilious polici-
es ofrapid economic developrnent, the civil and mittary buleaucrats suffered materi-
al ald psychic losses because their salaries failed to keep up with rapidly rising costs.
Thus, not only did the military fcel they had lost access to the pinnacle of power, but
social status and prestige in the bargain 
(30).
The change in ruling elites, 
(31) which derived from impofiant social transfor-
mations and reflected a shifi in political structures, was perceived by the anny as tlre
degradation of its own institutional prestige and a clrallenge to its image within soci-
ety. This was fu.ther aggravated in 1954 by the electoral success oflhc incumbeDls.
who played the military bureaucracy under tlreir control. Thus, for the first time irr Tur-
key, military power was subject to civilian authority.
The Background of the First Military Intervention
By the beSining of 1958 the DP govemment had become isolatcd from virtu-
ally all the iNri[dons of fte state. Fi$tly, it had been the press and the judiciary follo-
wed by the civil bureaucracy and frnally the army ald the univenities(31). Th" p"r-
formance of the DP government was highly criticised not only on its economic polici-
es but mainly on its enactnent of unconstitutionul lu*, (33).
Politically, there is an intimate lelationship between the dete.iorating econo-
mic situation and is impacts on the social life and politics. DP govemment responded
to this by taking measures to isolate the public ftom politics. After the tepresive mea-
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sues, political activity outside the framework of the Assembly became virtualty im-
possible. As the govemmenl could not deal with the rising demands within the soci-
ety, DP government found refuge in enacting unconstitutional laws and amendments
which gave tle govemment broad powels of intervention in conolling prices and eco-
nomy on the one hand and the mass media on th" ott 
", 
(34).
The military take-over of 1960 was a tuming point in the relationship between
civilian and military elites that had govemed the country since 1923. Karpat noted that
'jr.rstified as a stop necessary for the preservation of democncy. the action appeared to
be chiefly designed to answer a tkeat to the RPP, which had governcd Turkey ftom
1923 to 1950.(35)
Shains within dle civilian-military coalition had begun to develop as early as
1946, with the establishmert of the opposition DP. The Democrats interjcction of eco-
nomic issues into party politics was accompanied by an open display of animosiry to-
ward the mililary's irformal linkage with the RPP. The absolute majority election
system ensured the DP a far greater number of seas in the parliament than the percen-
tage of tlre votes it oblained 
(36). 
Mean*hile, Mender€s did nol try to amend the Cons-
titution of 1924 when the DP came to power in 1950. for he did not really disappove of
its provisio s. As Karpat poinlcd out " in fact he made use of lhc Constitution had ves-
ted too much authority and had been misused by the DP for partizan puposes."(37)
The 1924 Consritution stressed democracy over liberalisrn, even ifit produ-
ced neittrer. The basic freedoms were not spelt out in detail, and could be, and were qu-
ite easily curtailed. Nor was thele much emphasis on the separation of powers, the le-
gislature remaining thc domiDant institutition ofgovernment. It was a stlong parlia-
menlary system, but power also resided in the office of the president,
The extent of tlris power is closely related to political circumstances, irclu-
ding fie personality of the incumbents and the strengths and weakncsses of Prime Mi-
nisters, cabinets and the parliament. The 1924 Constitution made the presidency a
pany office. the chief of state being elected by each Assembly for a concurrent tenn.
The leaderof the party in power was elected in practice (Mustafa Kemal and Ismet
lnitnii from RPP and Celal Bayar from DP). The hesident held lhe authority to choose
the Prime Minister and to approve his choice of ministers 
(38).
ln the decade after 1950lhis Consrirudon teherefore quitc easily opened up
the way to the emergenc€ of a dominant party govemment. Following in the tradition
of the RPP, the DP govemment showed a marked tendency to autho.ituri-i.rn 
(39).
For the Army, the coup of 1960 ma*ed lhe begiffing of the process of its af-
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finnation in the political arena, and thus the defination of its identity. Although the mi-
litary did not implement identical policies during its three interventions (directly in
1960 and 1980, indirectly in 1971), having had to take societal changes into account,
its airn rernained the same : the establishrnent of a political systern which, on nurncrous
courlts, comprises the normative values of the arrny and conforms it a privileged posi-
tion.
As Heper and Tachau stated that " the Junta which carried out the 1960 mili-
tary coup may have intended to establish a regirne which would have fallen :;ornewhe-
re between Nordlinger's "guar<lian" and "ruler" types.(40) Lr actuallity, howevcr, atter
severe internal tensions and cont'rontations, the more moderate senior officers won
out over their younger collcagues, and the regirne assumed the character of a "guardi-
an" regime, i.e., one which took control of the govenlment for the purgtse of preser-
ving (or re-establishing) the status-quo (41).
Two types of problems concenrcd the National UniSi Council. In the political
sphere. the 1924 Constitution was suited to the emergence of an authoritarian-lcaning
regirne like that of the Democrats of 1950-1960. For democracy to survive in Turkcy,
thc mcmbers of the NUC felt it necessary to changc the Constitution. Thc ailing eco-
nomy was the second concem. The ofTicers emphasized that the wasteful policies of
thc Democrats had brought the econorny to the verge of collapsc with a rising intlation
rate and trade dcficits. To find solutions to thesc problcms. the olTicers cstablished a
Constituent Asscrnbly and governrnent largely composed of civilians.
Following the intervention except for the relatively short pcriod until tlrc ous-
ting of the "radical fourteen", tlrere was no real military junta installed in pover. In fact,
by the RPP, oncemore, although thcre were military personncl iu a nurnber of irnpor-
tant positions. Karpat stated that " it should be emphasized that the military rule of
1960, unlike the intervention of 1980 was wide-open from the beginning to coolxrati-
on and intercourse with civilians and these civilians belonged overhchningly to the
RPP."(42)
The RPP assumed the responsibility or guardianship of the state and Kcrnalist
principles. And the nrilitary saw itself as' the rnost concentrated enrbodiment of the
Kernalist elite for service to the state and nation.'It is true that the military olliccrs in
general felt greater sympathy for the RPP rhan for the DP. This syrnparhy had scciolo-
gical as well as political roots. They included the deteriorating socio-economic positi-
on of the officers corps,along with the civil bureaucracy, as well as the historical link
with the party through identification with Mustafa Kemal and his successor. Ismet
Pasha.
The new Constitution adopted on July 9,1961. It was explicit in emphasizing
democratic principles and the Kemalist concept of the Republic as a dernocratic, se-
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cular state based on human rights. This docurncnt included articles that dealt wirh tle
safeguarding of individual rights and frcedoms. the protection of citizens against abu-
ses of power by the local and national adrninistrations. tlre authonomy ofcouns, and
thc granting of unionization and strike rights to thc *orker. (43).
Unlike dre Constirurion of 1924. rhe Constitution of 1961 did openly recogni,
z-e lhe exislence ol-sotne social groups such as labor, and acknowlcdged the workers
right to organizc thcrnselvcs politically on the basis ofoccupation and interests. The
authors of lhc 1961 Consliturion i cludiog nernbc.s of thc Junta. who participatcd ac,
tivcly in tlc debatcs of lhe Co stitu€nt Asscmbly, sought to prcveit lhe re-enrcrgence
of a authoritarian pll'tisan rcgimc based on massive parlialnentary nrajorities. Thus,
lhey producr{ a reginre which placed rcstrictions on the govennnent's freedom of ac,
tion (i.e., by csrablishing a sccond parliameutary chamtrr. by adopling an elecloral
syslen bascd on a sllictly profDrtional system of refncscntation. by providing such
salicDt institulious as llrc universitics with broad autonomy and by cstablishing such
new instilutions as thc Constitutional Court wi(h powe(s to invalidate govcnnnentai
dccrees and legislatiol.)
SigDificantly, rhe rrcw rcgime also providcd motc instirutionalizcd channcls
for access kr thc topnrost ;xrlitical aurhority by tlrc milirary (drough rlre NSC). inclu-
ding lhc Milristry ofDcfensc alld thc scnior miliLary commandcrs.
Thcsc changcs werc also designcd to decentralize the state. TIrc 1rcwcn ofthe
Itcsidcnt became only symbolic (unlikc to 1924 and 1982). 1}e kesidcnt was to rep-
reser)i lo country a5 Head of SIatc; executivc powers wcre largely rcmowed frorn lrirn.
l)r-'cision-maling was rnainly in tlre hands ofthe Council of Mirristers, ilte Crand Nali-
onal Asscrnbly. Primc Minisrcr,Constitr.ltional Court. and rhe local administrations
(4.1).
Structurally, thc Prirne Minisicr and thc Cabinet constitute the chicf power
ccnter oflhc Turkish govcmment. The menlbers ofthc CabiDet have both collcctive
and individual responsibility. Tlrc framcrs ofthe l96l Constitution had to go to grcal
lcngths to limit thc possibility ofdorninance by any onc parry. The overall aint ofthe
ncw Constitution was 10 streDgthen dc[rocracy.
Taken togcther, the results ofeconomic and political policy decisions were
the emergerce of a liberal democratic ordcr, similar to those in West European sta-
tes,and the reacccptance of planning for economic developmcnt. The national electi,
ons of 1961, when political power was retunred to civilians, marked the beginning of
exlierimcntation with thesc conc€pts in the new Republic. However. the leader of the
Junta, general Ccmal Giirscl was electcd President ofthc Republic. Furthermore, the
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next two Presidents of the Republic were also rethed military officers (in the last
analysis, all presidents of the Turkish Republic, except Celal Bayar and the cufent
President Turgutozal. have been military figures).
The framers of re Constitution established a constitutional court and stren8-
thened the Council of State,both of which bodies were made quite independent of 8o-
vemrnental influence in the matter of their membeiship. In this and in other ways, dre
role of thejudiciary was greatly incteased and made indcPendent'
The universities and tlte Radio and Television Adrninislration were accorded
a luge deg5ee of autouomy. Also, there was a large mcasure oi fteedom for the press'
Tlre formation of busilrcss and other associations was also encouraged. For the fust ti-
me, llade unions were Siven the right to stsike. The olhcr iml.rtallt point was tlre chan-
ge to a election system of Proportional representation Tlre new syslem did not prcvenl
thc RPP and Justice Party (JP) ftom emerging as the two major panies. Bul Senerally
spcakinS, as we havc seen, coalition cabinets dominated the Pcriod 196G1980 
(45).
crisis in Turkish Democracy (1961-1980)
The Constitution of 1961 also gave voice !o asripations for social justice as
wcll as civil aM social rights. Then. for the hrst time undcr the Republic. a socialist
parry. the Turkish Labor Party (lLP). was estabtished. Organized labor made si8nifi-
cant gains amonS industsial worke6. Panly as a tesult of a new law authorizing the
right l,o sEike (1963). University studens h:came politically active, and the fust signs
of political polarization appeared. On the other hand. the era after thc 196l electioDs
becarne dominated with an inflation in the number of political panies ard their increa-
,lng potarization 
(46). 
As mini-crises dcveloped from time to iime' the military issued
thrcats ofgrearer or lesser subtlcty against the parties. inc.casilgly adopting an anti-
left position. Finally, on March l2,l97l,in ttrc face of rising violence on dre part of lef-
tist militant gloups, the military fotced the resignation of the Sovemmcnt. It was the
second military intervention in slightly more dran a decade and t[e same ain : safe gu-
arding of lhe state and Kemali.t prin"iple" 
(47).
The "coup by ultimatum" of l97l (48) *as the cuhnination of a deteriorating
political situation marked by a rising tide of violence, ftagmentation of political parti-
es and weak and ineffective govemmen!. Tlrough its intervention in politics, the mili-
ury exercised (or threaiened to exercise) a veto over civilian authorities with the goal
of presewing the social and economic status-quo. As Heper and Tachau pointed out:
The 1971 ialenertioa inTurkish politics resenbles what Nordlinger colls
"noderate" militat! rule.The difference between the 1960 and the l97l i enenti-
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o,',s was that tlv military commenders now apparenlly wished to keep the regime in-
tact wilh only moderate changes designed to slore up its authority against challen-
ges, particularly from the politicat U7(49) .
The essential reluctance of the military to seize power overtly, it was not long
before the civilian politicians openly flexed their muscles and forced the officers to yi-
eld on a highly salient issue. This confrontation took the fonn of a refusal on the part of
the major parties to rati$ dre military's favored candidate for the presidency of the Re-
public early fur 1973. It was a rare occasion on which the RPP and the JP formed a com-
ron front (50).
In the meantime, political polarization continued to develop, although violen-
ce was at least temporarily brought under control. The RPP carne under new leaders-
hip in 1972 with the resignation of Ismet Pasha and the elevation of the relatively yo-
uthful Biilent E""uit (5 l).
The takeover of March 1971 drew its impetus from the old tradition of the ar-
med forces association with the statist-elitists and the RPP. although it was a rather
premature, only half-thought out action. After the natural death of In<inii in 1973, the
RPP gradually discarded Kemalism as an ideology.
As Karpat stated that :
It tended to reject tlte concept of nalion (millet) and the idea tlrct Turl;ey was a
national slate. It sought for a solid social foundation on the basis ofu,hich it could
call itself atrue socialist nrass partJ... It is clear thal tlv deviatiotr of tle RPP to the
brt, its rejection of tlrc Kenwlist principles, and its espousal of a lrcdgepodge of mino-
rity and potentially explosive causes (for exanple, Kurdish nationalists found favor
with tlrc party) alienated tlrc ntilitary from the RPP in general and front Ecevit in par-
ti"ul*62).
Indeed. the political history of Turkey after 1971 is the history of final collap-
se of the old coalition with the military emerging as fte suprume arbiter above political
parties and social groups with the 1973 national elections, a new chapter began in Tur-
kish politics.
From 1973 until the 1980 coup, the country was run by weaker and weaker co-
alition cabinets coupled with deleriorating economic conditions and increasing politi-
"ul 
niol"n"" (53). Th" p-os of coalition formation, maintenance and dissolution be-
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gan to assume central importance in party politics. Extremist parties had the opportu-
nity of participating in coalition governments. So, they won an important role in the
political ur.nu (54).
Especially NSP and NAP were able to gain important ministerial posLs in the
coalition govemments due to parliamentary arithmetics and thus assumed a political
power and an important voice in the decision-making infact unproportionate to its
electorate success.
The rnost funportant problern with Turkish politics of the 1970s was the failure
of the political parties to make coalitions work effectively. In fact this is onc of the di-
lemrnas of the democratic fonn of govermnent not only in Turkey but also rnost deve-
loping countries. As Ergi.ider pointed out that:
On the one lmntl governntent nurst be based on a broatl base of consent utrl
be representative of nrujor social forces u,hile on tle otlrcr lrund governnental effec-
tiveness nrusl nat be contpronised to sol.te tlrc ntonentous social and econonic prob-
lents tlnt arises in the process of lrawforntutittrt. Failure to balance tlrcse tw,o para-
doxical objectives olien lectds to a decline oflegitinncy ofpotitical institutio,ts(55).
The stability of the Turkish political system and its capasity to tackle the irn-
portant social and economic issues is closcly related to the capacity of the political par-
ties to strike a @nsensus on constitutional refonns as well as on broad principles of po-
licies. The issues Turkey taced in the 1970s ranged from the consolidation ofsecula-
rism to population growth and educational refonn from consolidation of a rnarket-ori-
ented econornic systeln to constitutional retbnns on liberal political values.
At this poirrt, the capacity of the leaders of political parties to urake agreement
or pacts on the solution of social and economic problems and the consolidation of de-
mocracy was lTot sufficient. The lrclarization betweerr the two major political parties
to the point where no compronrise or bargaining could be achieved.
Turkish politics in the 1970s was thus characterized by excessive fragrnentati-
on and polarization, and by a lack of decisive authority on the part of the governlnent.
Polarization came to characterise not only the parties, but important social sectors as
well, including organized labor. the teaching profession, the civil bureaucracy. and
even the police.
At the same tirne, exhemist militants engaged in escalating violence. Political
assassinations came to include members of parliament, and ex-prime minister, promi-
nent journalists and university professors. Some of the victims were exftemists of the
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left or the right. but others (pafticularly among thejournalists and professors) were
modcrates. As Hefrer and Tachau staled that:
The laltcr tJpc of assassiutiotl r|tts clearl! desiilned to ndernine th. politi-
cal center and acceletate the process of polatiztttion. Nor wcre ussassinn!k)ns thc
onl! ford of violcnce. Thcte. :crc also nassfue ortbreak of connunal anflil in sc-
vcral provincial cities ntarked bt an ontitous emergente d iucr-ehnic (i.e., Kur-
dish:l urkish) aul intcrsectarfun (Sunni,Shii) cleavages. TtEre can be little rluesti-
on lln! tllese lru.litional cleavages u'ere ftunetl and c.rploited by politicul ert,err,ists.
&ui tlcr thtcatened to brcadcn the base ofpolitical violen.e in an oceptionully tlan-
r 56)gcrott r1a|
The crisis was furdrer cxacerbated by rampant infladon accompanied by seri-
ous industrial slowdowns and shor!ages of co sumer and imfJottant goods. By the
surnnrer of 1980. the rate ofpolitical killings had rcached an average of over 20 per day
(s7).
The activities of the NSP during fie 1970s was agailrst thc secularist aspects
of Kcnralism. As Topr:rk notcd drat "the NSP was a nco-lslanric pa y whose major
co[ccnl was thc partial retradilionalization of Turkish cultute along Islarlic prc-
""pt.." 
(58) Th" NSP's concept of F)lilical developmenl also remaincd vaguc until
1980 when the pruty orgarriz-ed tlrc "Korrya March" in a call lbr the rcplacemcnt ofthe
sccular systcn with a shariat ordcr. This eveDt is said to have inllamcd lhc milildy aDd
promptcd them to inre.u"n" (59).
Firrally. bctween 1973 and 1980 Trjrkey's economic growlh declined with
growth indicators showing scrious economic problcms; GNP s growth rate declined
from 8.0 in 1975 to - 1.0 in 1980 ttre nadc dehcit reachcd thc S 4.7 billion mark in 1980.
lhc ilflation.ate junlFd over lm pcrcent. and hade as pcrcent ofGross National Pro-
ducts (GNP) fcll sharply. as shown in Tablc 1.
Thcsc poor economic indicators were coupled with dccline ofpolicy pcrfor-
mance in social cquity. hrvestment in cducatior conlinued to dcclire adding morc fuel
to srudent urucst on univcrsity campuses. The wages ofbucaucrats the largest wage-
eaming group in the country, fell below the 1963 level. Militiuy cxpcnditues soared
up with dramatic jump in 1976 following the US arms ambargo ol1 Turkey. The wages
of workers, on the other hand, remained relatively high bul unemployment moved to
over 20 percent in 1978 (60).
Under these worsening conditions (as shown in Table 1), Turkish society be-
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came tluougt y politically polarized. While the number of labot sfikes per year and
their intensity increased, political violence between labor unions, student groups, po-
lice organizations, teachers' organizations and most important the political panies,
became an every day activity.
Given these critical circumstances, it is pelhaps to be wondered why the mili-
tary did not intervene rnuch earlier than September 12, 1980. Economic brcakdown,
civil violence, andopen challenges to such highly symbolic valucs as secularist natio-
lalism, all of these were important reasons fo. military iotervention. In the cyes of the
rnilitary, all these facets fused into one major failue olthe system: the complete erosi-
on of governmental authority.
Three major factors account for the dete orating political situation in Turkey
from 1973 - 1980. First was thc polaizatior betwen the two major political panies to
the point where no cornpromise or bargainilg could be achievcd. The second was the
Justice Party's protection of the aDti-state, militant, right-wing panies, the NAP and
NSP, for the sake ofkceping the JP in ofhce. Third. once in ofllce, all of lhe political
pa(ies alternptcd to fill $e bureaucracy with their loyalists. The outcomc was the se-
vere polarization of $e Turkish bureaucracy.
Thc fragmentation amorrg the political cadres reflected to a larSe extent the
fragmentation and polarization laking place in society at large. Law ard order had to
be restored. but in tlre eyes ofthe military that cor]ld not be accornplished without re-
solving the conflict arnong rc political actors in the first place. On lhe other hand,
tiagrnentatioD and polarization witlrirr and amorg governmcntal or civilian instituti-
ons could have adversely aflected tlrc military organization itself.
Turkish politicalcultwc has traditionally placed great value on govemrnental
autholity. No group could bc cxpccted to take this matter more seriously than the mili-
tary. lt could be argued that lhe military slbuld not have intervered ifit really had dre
cause ofdemocracy at heart. OD tlris argument the military should have allowed the
Iiolitical systcm to put itsclf to rights. Bchind dris vicw lics the belief tlat thc political
systeln must leam to solve its own problems ifit is to gain the exprience and collecti-
vc wisdorn necessary for suvival.
The problem lies with the political elites. The greater mrnplexity of
society which follows ftom economic and so
The problem Lies with the political elites. The greater complexity of sociery which fol-
lows from economic and so
Tlre problem lies with the political elites. The greater complexity of society which fol-
lows from economic and social development may well make military intervention
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Table I : lndicalors ol Grourth, Equiity, Order and Liberty



















































































































































































































Sources : Siale lnstilut€ ol Slatistics, Slalistlcal Yearbooks (1965-81)i State Planning organrzatron, Annual Programs (1965-83);
SPO, Secto€l Reporl: Education (1983); SPO, Trends and Prospects in Turkish Labor Force (1982); Ministry of Labor, Labor Force Statislcs
{1965, 1973, and 1982); Ministry o, Juslice, Adalel lstatislikleri (Juslice Stalistics) (1968-81)i Index on be mililary expendiUres is calculated
by dellalind lotal deiense expenditures by consumer pric€ index of eadr year: Genel Kurmay BaSkan[Ot, Halkla lligkiler B0rosu, (Chiet ol
Stall Publjc Relations Olfic€), "Tutuklu lstatisrikleri", (Statistics on Prisone6) (1983)iThe stalictics on wages is transtormed from currenr
wages to real value s by dellating the currcnt wages using lhe conswer price ndex of each year with the stariing value of 1 963= 1 00.
Cufienl wages are oblained from rhe SPO and SlS. (61)







































































































































more difficult but it is never impossible because of unsuccessful civil leaders. More
developed states than Turkey have been governed by the military often with disasho-
us results. The success of democracy depends on the success of political elites. If poli-
tical elites are successful, the milirary will not intervene to system easily. The justifi-
cation, or if you will. the legitirnization tbr each military intervention was based on t5e
failures of political parties to rule effectively and democratically.
The tragcdy of the Turkish systern was that moderates of the nrajor parries co-
uld not join togethcr, but were forced apart in order to cope with their extremist wings.
The leaders of rhe two major parties ( Rpp and Jp ) were frequently criticized by the
moderate opinion in Turkey for not fonning a coalition of moderates to deal with vio-
lence and thc economic situation. but we can appreciate that the logic of the system of
competitive politics as much as personel anirnosities blinded thern to the elfects of
their actions.
orr the other hand, in Turkish political elite, there is no value copsensus or will
for preserving dcmocracy and interaction arnong factions. undoubtedly. this is rela-
ted to political and historical cultures and to the historical framework. However. Tur-
kish plitical elites must change this understanding or their behaviors. The growth of
democratic consensus is the most irnportant factor for the survival of democracy. If
grolitical elitcs cannot attain success in providing dernocratic consensus and preser-
viug dernocracy. other institutions (such as the military) seize the opportunity of ta-
king over political power. Shortly, the lack of cooperation, collaboration and cornpro-
mise arnong the leaders of plitical partics lead to the destruction of the political balan-
ce which had previously guaranteed tlte survival ofdemocracy.
It has been observed that social agitation prevails in most crisis situations apd
in all takeovers the govenrrnent in power had restored to declaration of martial law. In
such critical instance is the military is in the position of obeying the civil govemrnents
orders that he might evaluatc as not being neufal and always in relation to electoral ex-
pectations. The militiuy's commitment to be apolitical and neutral is paradoxical in
such cases, and the military chose to intervene directly to the political life to be able to
stay neutral and establish order when tlre civilian govenrments failed to do so. The le-
gitirnacy of the civil institutions was not qucstioned as a concept but their perfomran-
ce had been at stake.
In short, ideally, the role of the Turkish armed forces is to remain above and
outside politics, and to act as defenders of the Turkish state against extemal enemies.
Politization and factionalization of the armed forces is to be avoided at all cost. This
does not mean, however, that the military are not interested in tfie internal affairs of the
JJ
state.
Aftermath of ihe l9E0 Intervention
On September 12, 1980 the military moved again. This time thcy ruled di-
rectly for three yean and produced a new sysiem that maintained for dremselves a di-
rect but limited role in majority party rule. AI political Parties were balned and thcir
leaders were barred by law from politics for periods from 5 to l0 years 
(62).
According to Heper and Tachau:
"Tle attitudes of rle post - 1980 nilitan junta clea J itlicue tlat it did not
regard itself as moderator regime nor thal il irtended its coup netely lo exercise a
political velo.Tte lunia's perceptioa of il$e[ concorns ntorc closely to Nordlinger's
second calegory of o "guatdian" regine, for clealb lhe inrenlion l&s becn to rcnkNe
coffupl and squabbling politicians, revamp the nachincry of governnrcnt, and te'
.listtibute sonv polifical powet ad ecorctnic ,"*ordr." 
(63)
However. Nordlinger's third cateSory of a "ruler" qlPe was more suitable than
the "guardian" type at this point. The military junta had as its goal not confol but ofEn
basic changes in significant aspects of the polilical, econornic and even social systeln.
Ever since the coup ir 198O, Turkey's relations with the European Commu-
nity caused pressure on the junta io tenrm b civilian rule. The only two itllies that suP
ponad the actions of the generals were Great Britain and the United States. YeL both
also expressed thei wish for a return to democracy in Turkey when lhe time was riSht
(64).
Possibly crucial factor in determining the Tu*ish anny's political anitudes
may be the fact thst alone among the Neir Ea.'ttem countnes, Turkey is a membe! of
NATO and the Council ofEurope, besides having an Associate status with the Euro-
pean Communiry which is supposed to lead eventually to full membership. This in-
volves Turkey in formal obliSations to respect democratic principles which do not af-
fect the leadership of most developing counrries 
(65).
The armed forces have on several occasions been aware of lhe s€rious extemal
problems which would be created if they would fail to convince the outside world that
inlerventions would be succeeded fatly quickly by the reinstallation of a democrati'
ca.lly elected govemment 
(66).
It is had to prove the impoftance of this factor in the General's decisions befo-
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re and after 12 september 1980, but impossible to dismiss it entirely. It was important
to them to keep their relations with the westem allies on as even a keel as possible (for
example, Twkey was suspended from membership of the parlimentary Assembly af-
ter the 12 September Coup).
The 1980 military junta i'sisted on more far-reaching refonns than its prede-
cessors. It was certain to retain a significant role in the new regime. The generals deci-
ded that before te transition to civilian rule could take place certain essential measures
had to be taken. Those who carried out the 1980 coup found the 196l constitution lar-
gely responsible for the political crisis. The military regime quickly moved to replace
this with a new constitution, adopted in 1982. It broughtdrastic changes to Turkey's
political order.
The military rulers of 1980 - 1983 tried to provide laws and a consrirutional
machinery for preventing an evenEal retunr to anarchy. However, the army's greatest
problern, it appears, was not in dealing with teh terrorists, but with the politicians.
They broke the democratic rules in the 196l constitution. As Hanis stated that :
'The nilitary leaders souglu to carry out these ains by reu,orking the consti-
tution arul anentling tlrc political parties act antl tlrc election law. It would be a ntista-
ke, hou'ever, to regad the 1982 constitution, as nuch nore oulltorilarian rhan the
onc enacted in 196I,for tlrc 196I docunwnr was the basicnodelfor the new order."
(67 )
The adustments embodied in the 1982 version were designed to provide ways
to prevent partiamentary deadlock or to end it through such expendients as elections.
The focus was on creating a systern that would provide the voters with an effective go-
ventment, not to restricl the options and the ability of the electorate to express its will
and wishes. Harris added that "it was clear that the framers of the constitution saw
anarchy as a denial of democracy and hoped to inject greater discipline into society
tluough such mechanisms as a more hierarchical educational stuchrre under a centra-
lized board of directors." (68)
The Constitution replaces the bicameral Assembly with a single National As-
sembly composed of 40 members elected every five years. It also calls for a presiden-
tial system by concentrating powers in the executive branch and restricdng individual
righs and liberties. Attempts to limit and connol political participation while at the
same time decreasing the representativeness of the TGNA and increasing govemmen-
tal effectiveness poses a new problem for the consolidation ofTurkish Democracy in
the 1990s.
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According to the 1982 Constitution, the president is elected by the National
Assembly for a single sevcn-year term Compared to the pre-1980 presidential po-
wers, the ncw executive branch he$ extra Powcrs. Not only his cxecutive powcrs but
also legislative and judicial powers were expanded
The new Constitution provides a lorrg lisl of such ;rowers aud classifies them
;1 5;.1,: 1O4 (69). 4mong the President's grwers relating to legislativc fr'mctions are:
delivering. ifhe deems it lrecessary. thc inaugural address at the begirrning of each le-
gislative year; summoniDg lhe TGNA irto session whcn he deerns it nccessary; Prc-
rnulgating laws; returrring laws to the Assembly for reconsideratior, rubmitting pro-
posed corlstitutional amendments to popular rctiranda, appealillg to the Constitutio-




The hesidcnt's powers pertaining to the executive funclion are as follows; ap_
poiutiug the Prirne Minister and acceptirlS his resignation; approving or rejecdng ot-
her miristers proF)sed by thc kime Miristcr; presiding ovcr the rneering ofdrc Coun-
cil of Ministers whencvq hc dccms il r)ccessffy; accrediling Turkish diplollatic rcp-
resentalives b forcign statcs: Promulgaling inlcmalional featics; rcpresenliDg thc of-
tice of lhe Comrnander -in Chief of drc Turkish Anned Forccs on belralf of tltc TGNA;
nrobilizing anned forces; appinting the Chicf of the Ceneral StafT. calling meetings
ofthe Natioial Sccurity Council and presiding ovcr it; proclairninB martial law or a
sute of emcrgency in collaboration with lhe Council of Ministcrs; signing govern-
meDtal decrees; appointing the cha;man and members ofdrc State Supcrvisory Coun-
cil arld instructirg it to carry out investiSations and inspcctions; appointing the rnem-
bers ofthe Board of Higher Education: and appointing universiry r"",or, 
(71).
Finally. the kesident's powers petlaininB to tlrejudicial functiotrs are: appo-
inting the members of the Constitutioml Court. one-fouth ofthc melnbers of drc Co-
uncil of State (the highcsl adminisFative court). the Clrief ptosecutor of the Coun of
Cassation ald his deputy, the tnembers of the High Military Administrative Court,
and the members of tlre Suprume CouncilofJudges and Prosccutors 
(7?).
The President is elected by a two-thids majoriry of the full membership of tlrc
Assembly. If a political party maintains the majority in the Assembly, it can obtah this
additional power through a simple majority vote. Orr dre other hand, the most impor-
tant point that the President is not politically responsible for his actions connected
with his offtce. Since it is one of the fundamertal rules ofpublic law that aufiority and
responsibility must go hand in han4 the absence of political rcsponsibility for the Pre-
sident and the constitutional requiement lhat all presidential decrees must be signed
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by the Prime Minister and the Ministers concemed meaos that the executive funclion
is, in reality, exercised by rhe politically reqxnsible cornponenel of the executive
b.un"h (73).
With regard to individual rights and fr€edoirs. thc rcsrrictions introduccd by
thc amendrnents of 1971 wcre cuhninated in the l9g2 Constitution. Article 13 of the
Constitutioi includes a rather extensive list ofconditions under which the govern_
ment can rcstricl individual rights an liberties by law.
Irr comparison, tlrc l96l Constitution did not include any such arlicle. ll is irn-
portani lo note drat key concepts in Article 13, like 'irational security,, ard ',gcneral
tranquillily". are left undefined. The vagueness of lhese terms allows each adminisrra-
tion to dcline them as best firs its own interests. For example. with regard ro the free_
dom of thc press, llre Constitution states that freedom is guaranteed. cxcept thal anyo,
ne:
... u ho urites or pritts ary hl,r:s or atticles v.ltich thrcaten tlE inlcrnal ot er-
lcmal sccuri! oflle srare or tlL inisiblc integrit\ ofthc stdte ''ith its territorr aru!tt tl ion- hhi h tcnd b incitc offolta. rin!. or nsurrt,cli rt. ur ... r.ho l,titls ot tra,Ltnits
such neus or aflicles to otlrrt ... slkll be lLld rcspotuiblc under tltc ktu.reletau ro
th"re of1r,ns"r(74).
As thc Helsinki Watch Cornrnittec rcports, this press provision seems to es
tablish not a gurantec of frccdorn ofspeech, bul "pcnurnbras of unprotected sPi:ech,'.
(75)
On these occasions, thc broad civil. political and social rights it dctails may be
suspendcd tlle name ofnational intcrcst, As shown above. there are some rcstrictions
on publications (which rluealen the extemal security and rhe integriry ofdre srate) and
strikes (which arc not banned unless thcy have political encls; (76) nn6 on political par-
ticipation. Thc Constitution prohibits the trade unions frorn associatir)g themselves
with polidcalpanies and resricrs their plilical activirics (77).The right of associat!
on is guranteed, except that associatio[s nray not:
... Conlravte tlv general resrrictions in A icle is, nor slwl thel pursru poli-
lical ains conduct political acr !, rccci'e suppo fion ot giNe support to political
pa ies, ot lake concrete a.tionwith labor uhions, u'ith professional ossociations lu-
ing public functiolts o, .itlrfoundation, 
(78),
The main purpose of these restdctions seem to !'revent participation of unions
and associations in 1rclitics. A further restrictions on political participation states that:
3t
... Associations, founclations, ttade unions, and professional associations
with public Junaions, sltall not organize assenb!ies ot demonstration 
n/tatchcs be'
yontl tltt: scopc ol their lt'gitinatc fields o[ actitity tntl lcgitinute atnts" 
'''
The restrictions are quite vague with the pltases "legitimaE ftelds of activity"
and "legitimare aims" lcli undefined
Trade union aciivities were t'o bc furtlrer rcgulated by the new Law No 2812
on "Trade Unions, Collective Bargaining' Strikes and L'ockouts" This law litnits rhe
formadon of Dew unions and places resl ctions on ight io strike
The 1982 Consdrutiorl continues its predecessol's provisions for a National
security council (Nsc). 
(80) Thi' body *ut originally created in the l96t constituli
on to assist in "taking decisions and ensuring necessary coordination" irr the domain 
of
national security policy in its broadest defination' The NSC was often uscd during 
drc
previous prioJolcivilia[ rulc for the public expression of military wislres; the com-
mand"rs of tlre 
".med 
forces issucd thci decleratioD in March 1971 a:t melrrbeN of dle
NSC. The military takeovcr ol 1980 was also accomplislrcd in the nanle of this My'
As for Ifie Higher Education Courcil. mandatcd by rlte new Corrstirurion' 
(81)
this body is desiSned to provide cenfial supewision of the various institutiolN of hig-
her eduladon to ensure thal thcy ofJerate ir confonnity with le objcclives and prin-
ciples set forth by law. This coutrcil' csrahlished in 1982' was accordcd extcnsive aut'
hority to appoint university govcrning boards'
In essence. tluough thcsc decisions univeNities lost thcir authonomy and be_
came state-conftollcd trainirg centers for re Turkish university activities (curricu-
lum, research, teaching staft) lhrou8hout Turkey.
To further increase statc confiols over academic research. such autonomous
institutions as the Turkish Historicat Society (Tiirk Tarih Kurumu) and the Turkish
Language Socicty (Tiirk Dil Kurumu) were placedunder the newly created Atatiirk
High hlstitution ofCulrure. Languagc and Hislory 
(82). Ttlese two ilrstitutions wcre
established in the l930i and had remaiued as auloiomous centc6 oi rescalch in Tur-
kish Language and History. gaining on intematinol Eputation for their work. h was
also expressed in the will of Atati.ift that th€se institutions should remain aulonomous
bodies receiving finaucial supPort ftom his estate 
(83)' 
By tralsforming these institu-
tions into state-controlled establishments the coup makers in fact violated Atatiirk's
will. In any cas€, this move by the military regime imposed funher statc con&ols over
the intellectua.ls ofthe country.
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All $e developments discussed above indicate that bueaucratic confols over
political participation in Turkey have been strengthened. giving the Third Republic an
authoritarian atmosphere. Sinilar to tlre restrictions on political participation by asso-
ciations, NSC and its allies took measures to contsol the formation of political parties
(&) 
that would enter thc national elections in November 1983. Funhermore, the elec-
toral law was reuritlen to mike it more likely to rctum dral one-party majoriry goven-
ments to the TGNA insiead of unstable coalition governments.
1982 Constitution was broadly modeled on drc 1958 French Constitution
(85). 
Although retairling a classic division of powerc. it was inrended to strengthen the
executive powcr of re President, limit drc role of political Parties, and circumscribe
the exercise of individual and associational rights drar Inight threaten national unjty
and security.
The Constitution was acceptcd by more than 87 perce of the electorate ' 92
perceit of thc 95 percent who voted - on Nove,nter ?. t982 
(86).
It is imporlant to note that the 1982 Conslitution was significantly dift'erent
frorn the 1961 Constitution. While tlre 1960 Coup leaders aimed al prcventing ltrc .isc
of authoritarian regimes by establishing a libcral order. 1980 Coup coalition's main
concern was the restriction of libcrties inc luded in the 196 I .
The fact tlrat Kcmalism has trcen modified and rchterpreted after the 1980 mi-
Iitary intcrvention mfly in facl be related to thc syndrome of being lonely at the iop. TIle
rnilitary coup of 1980 accomplislred what rhc conservatives ilr Turkey long desired:
the establishme t of a rightist restrictive political order wifh liberalism in economics.
Perhatrt, the ruling elite's desire to create a Turkish'style libcralism closely resembles
nineteenth cenlury European Liberalism with thc excePtion that citizens have voting
righs in Turkcy. The system, on the one lrald favors liberalism ard fiee competition in
economics. On the othcr han4 it limits political Parricipation lo tlrose who dominate
thc economic sccb. ln any case, this type of "libcralism" is highly da gerous because
such liberalizing efforts in the economy will create lnore ftolitical concems for all citi-
zcns alike. Urrless the individuals are provided wilh Polilical channels to effectively
voice tlreir opinions in these matt€rs, further social unrest is likely to emelge.
Conclusion
The military institution has advanced itself as the champion of the Public inte-
rcst in Turkey it has been the miliury often dubbed the "guardian of Turkish Democ-
racy".
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With the breakdown of Tu{kish democracy in the lare 197&, the military re-
mained the only united elemenl capable of restoring order. In conhast to thc preceding
coups, the Septembcr 12, 1980 intervention dernonstrated both careful plaNring and
military unity. As Ergiider pointed our that "this military interlude, in cornparision
widr the previous ones, was longcr-tlree years- and more radical in terms oisolutions
the military leaders tried to unplc,nent'. (87)
Thc urilitary policy of cenralization and reform was intended lo prevent the
reclurence of terrorism and disordcr. But it was also rtreant to rcduce the ability ol poli-
tical actors and pressure groups activily for providing libcral democracy.
The 1982 Constilution is declared to be uDUt for Turkey by all of the parlu-
mentary fxllitical pafiies. eaclr of whiclr seems lo havc a differcnt opinion aboul what
drc contenl of the Turkish Constitution should bc. Various articles of thc 1982 Consri,
lution (as slrowr befbre) arc iiopr:rativc for all practical purposes. Various articlcs co-
dirying thc aclivitics of associations arc cousidcred to bc ir co[tradiction with tiec-
dorn ol expression and othcr libcrties.
Social cquity in Turkcy was neSativcly rclated to rnilitary regirnes and poli!-
cal ordcr. Basically. dcspite drcir poor perforrnanccs in this ficld, rhe civilian rcgirnes
have paid morc attcntion !o lllc irDprovcmcnt of social equily than dtc olficcrs. It is fo-
und lhat litrrty is weakencd undcr military regimcs and timcs ofeconontic growth. ln
fact. lhe Dlilitify rcsimes did not changc thc dcvelopment policics oftlrc pre-coup ci-
viliaD administrations. For social equity, howevet, thc presence ol'military regirDes
mca[l furlhcr decline in thesc iidicators. In shorl lhe civilian rcBimes placcd more
ernphasis on libcrty and social equiry than dre military reginres.
The 1961 Consrirulioll was quickly amendcd in 1971. restricting its libcral
elements. Ironically. the arncndrncnts to the Constilution, desigred Io increase law
and ordcr in Turkey. were quickly iguored by 1976 with irrcrcasilg anarchy and ;nliri,
cal violcnce. Finally. aftcr ninc ye;rs. drcsc amcndmcnls along widl 1961's libcralde,
mocracy wcrc cast aside by lllc 1980 coup makcrs.
Despitc lhe transfer of powcr to civilians. the political strucrure of thc srate
closely resembles burcaucratic-authorita anism. Thc framework ofthe 1982 Consu,
tulion, increases in statc con[ol of associations lhrough new laws. vadous restrictions
on individual liberties. and lhe way tlte rcgime hansfer !o civilians was carefully cont
rolled, all indicate that order weighs more heavily thaD liberry in the ncw period.
In sum, the Third Republic of Turkey has made her a member of tlre authorita-
rian regimes in the Western Woild. The process through which democracy broke
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down during the Second Republic involved a complcx inlcraction ofF)litical and eco-
nomic va ables, both in domestic and external fields. Also. these relationship's wcre
highly crucial in the eslablishmcnt ofelite coalitions wlich in runl helped aBgrevare
powcr com[})tition bclwecn thc elitcs.
The cornparision bctweeD Turkcy and Western Europcan counhies. fiorn dc
mocratic poi of vicw. the overwhelming majoriry of thc Turks not orrly defcnd the
principles ofdcrnocracy bul dcmnrd that it be prolcctcd and fully iilplcrncntcd. Ho-
wever, it would sccm llral the sprit of denrocracy may bc prcserved in Turkey if iLs
irnplementation and adlni istariton arc made compaliblc with tlle counlry's traditions
of governmcnt and political culturc. This irnplies that democracy in Turkey Inay have
to be implcnrcnlcd by means other than thosc known in the West.
ln othcr words, thc Turkish situation contradicts thc colnmon vicw, accepted
by Westcrn studcnts oflrllitics. thal dctnocracy is Ihe product comprimes and aggree-
nrcnt amonB civilia|l groupr. Dcmocracy in Turkey bcgan to be undermind whcn thc
$aditional undcrslanding of govcrnnlcnl and aurhority. Their implicit supcmacy bc,
gart to be rcplaccd by an ir)dividu.rlistic itnd i tcrcsl oricntcd understanding of go,
vcnnnenl and aulhorily. ht spite of solnc ilnporlnnt rcasons (as cxplained abovc). all
lluee crisis rcsulted lion) lhe failurc ofthe civilian to contprirnise or lcam lo live cach
otllL'r. whclhe, in;nuer or tn opporilion.
Il) addition to, irlstitulionalized is the mosl imF)flanl f'actor for sulvivaloldc
rnocracy 
(88). 
How dcmocracy has bccn nraintaincd in a country with wcak grlitical
inslitutions and low lcvcl ofcousessus (govenrirq wilhoul conse[sus, republic witho
ul govcmmcnt, crisis of lhe slale parlianlenl, crisis ofdcrnocracy).
Finally, when Turkey. in 1946 passed to mulri-party systcm, wc thoughi that
the liberal dcmocracy was sel but il w:ts wrorrg rcllccljvcs; it was only a flr$ stcp to re
liberal democracy. Aftcr fron this years, system in thc transition lxriod. brought so-
rnc crisis suclr as 1960 - I97l . 1980 crr'rs.
NOTI]S
l. h is not our inlcndon here to extunine dre different dcfiilation of the denrocracy. Ne,
vcfihclcss. thc bcst dcfination was summarized by Linz as fallows: "...l,egal
frecdom to lbnnulate and advocate political altcmativcs with the concomr
nant righls to l-ree association, ftee speech. and othcr basic freedoms of per-
son. free and nonviolent cornpctition among leaders with periodic validation
of their claim to rule, inclusion of all cffective political oftices in dre democra-
tic process, and provision for the participation ofall mcmbers ofthe political
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preferences. Practically. this means the freedom to creat€ political parties and
to conduct free and honest elections at regular intervals without existing any
effective political office from direct or indirect electoral accountability." Juan
J. Linz and A. Stephan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Bal-
tirnore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1978). p.5 For a detailed discussi-
on see Robert A. Dahl. A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago,Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1956), Alan Lijphart Democracies,Patlerns of Mojo-
ritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (New Ha-
ven, Yale Uniiversity Press, 1984). Philippe Schrnitter,L. Whitelrcad and G.
O'Donnell, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democ-
racy (Baltirnore, John Hopkins Universiry Press, 1986).
2. For a suwey of the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes see Juan J. Linz, " Totalita-
rian and Authoritarian Reginres, "'in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W.
Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Massachusetts. Addison-Wes-
ley Publishing Cornrnpany, 1975 ),vol.3, pp. 175411.
3. For the critical interpretation of rnilitary intervention in these countries see Ulrike
Liebert and Maurizio Cottz, eds."Parliament and Democratic Consolidati-
on in Southern Europe : Greece, Italy, Portugal. Spain and Turkey (Lon-
don, Pinter Publishers, lD0), Larry Diamond. Juan J. Linz and Scyrnow M.
Lipset. eds., Democrac.v in Developing Countries : Asia (Colorado, Lynne
Rienner. 1989). vol.3, and Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin
America, vol.4.
4. Atati.irk's speech analyzing the draft Fundameutal Law bill being debatcd in Tur-
key's war-time parliarnent, Dccernber I,l92l,T.B.M.M. Zabtt Ceridesi
(Ankara, T.B.M.M. Matbaasr. 1958), Devre 1. Igtima 2, vol.14, p.428. Musta-
fa Kemal was making clear that Turkey "does not resemble a dcrnocracy, does
not resemble s,ocialism. and does not resemble anything! Sirs, we must be pro-
ud rrot to resernble thern! Because we resemble ourselves."
5. George S. Harris. "The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s: Guardians or
Decision-Makers?". in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., State. Democ-
racy and the Military, Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter,
1988), pp.l77-200.
6. See Clrristian Rumpf. "The Military. the Presidency, and the Constitution: A Com-
parative Approach to the Weimar Republic, France 1958, and Turkey 1982",
in Metin Heper and Ahrnet Evin,eds., State, Democracy and the Military,
pp.?15-238.
7. See Ustiin Ergtider, "Redernocratization and Elections in Turkey", prepared for de-
livery at the 24th Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Assocuation.
San Antonio Convention Center,November IG13,1990.
8. Ibid., pp.4-5.
9. For a detailed analysis of the major consequence of increased fragmentation in the
42
Turkish palty system see Sabri Sayan, Parlam€nter Demokrasilerde Koa-
lisyon Hiikiimetleri (lstanbul, Bolazigi Univenitesi Yayrm. 1980), pp.l90'
200 and Ergun Ozbudurt Scial Change and Political Participalion in Tur-
key (Princeton, Princeton University Press. 1979).
10. Septernber 12 th, 1980 is the date of fie last military intervention. Ergiider, "Rede-
mocratization and Elections in Tu*ey', p.5.
I I . For more detailed analysis of conrpctitive elitism in liberal democracies see David




14. A detailed study of tlre polarization of the Turkish buteaucracy can be found h Mc'
tin Heper, "Negativc Bureaucratic Politics in a Modemizing Context: The
Turkish Case. " Journal of Soulh Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, I
(September 1977). Also see MetiD He1rr, "Bureaucras.Politicians and Offi-
cers il Turkey Dilemmas of a New Political Paradigm."Prepared for Submis-
sion at the "Colloquim on Continuity and Change in Turkey,"The Universiry
of Pennsylvalia" Philadelphia, Aprill6-l 7. 1982.
15. Nordlinger has classified tluee models of Inilitary. [n dre first of these, the mililary
act a5 "moderators". Typicacally. in this model, lhe mililary do not overtly sei-
ze thc reins of govemmet but ratlrcr exctcise " veto 1nwer" from behind the
sceues. Thc Soals of mililary groupE which fit this model are correspondingly
limited in scope as preserving tfie slatur-quo,maintaining tlre balance of po-
wcr among contcnding groups. ...ensuring polidcal order and govenrtnental
stability. A second modclof rnilitary rcgirne is refered !o as a "Suardian" regi-
me. Military guardians are essentially sirrrilar to moderators excePt that thcy
fcel it necessary to displace the civilian govenors, that is, to overtly assume
conrol of govemment. Their goals. however, are as consewative as those of
tlre moderators. Finally, the third g'pe of military rcgime is rhe ruler rype. This
typc of regime has as its goal not only coltfol but often basic clranges in signi-
ficant aspects of the political,economic, and even social system The rulel
q?es arc likely to stay in place for a more exteDded priod of time, perhaps in-
dcfinitely. Eric A. Nordlinger. Soldiers in Polilics: Military Coups and Go'
vernm€nts (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp.22-27 .
Dodd has also noted that "the Turkish military is frequently regarded as the guardian
of democracy." See Clement H. Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy
(Walkington, Eothen Press, 1983), p.l.
16. Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish D€mocracy, p.23.
17. Ibid.
18. Metin Heper and F. Tachau, "The StaF, Politics, and the Military in Turkey",
Comparative Politics, 16 (October 1983), p.l1.
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19. See more detailed Walter F. Weiker, The Modernization of Turkey (New york,
Holmes-Mener Publishers Incs, 198 I ), pp.37 - 39 and Dodd, The Crisis ol
Turkish Democracy, pp.2-4.
20. Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Arrny and the Founding of the Turkish republic"
World Politics, 4 (July 1959). p.516. For a detailed, see. also. Dankwarr A.
Rustow, "The Military : Turkey", in Dankwart A. Rustow and R.E.Ward,
eds., Political Moclernilzation in Japan and Turkey (Princeron. princeton
University Press., 1964. pp.36l-363).
2l . For the interprararion of the Young Turk revolution of 1908 as tro be the first inter-
vention in politics sec Dood, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy, p.2.
22. Heper and Tachau. "The Srate, Politics, and the Military in Turkey," p.11.
?3. Ibid.
24. For an elaboration. see Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Go-
vernments ch.3.
25. A detailed study of the political evolurion of the DP carr be found in Metin Toker,
Tek Partiden Qok Parti-ve (lstanbul. Akis Matbaasr. 1970). Kernal Karpat
Turkev's Politics the Transition to a Multi-Party system (prirceton, prin-
ceton Universiry Prcss, 1959) and Cem Eroful, Demokrat parti (Ankara, Se_
ving Matbaasr. 1970).
26. Heper and Tachau. "The Srate, Politics. aud the Military in Turkcy", p.20.
27. Ibid.
28. "The new man in Turkish politics, is the lawyer and tlre rnerchant. replacing the
soldier and the bureaucrat at the pinnacle of forrnal power." See Frederic w.
Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Carnbridge, Mass., M.I.T. kess, 1965),
pp. 195-196. On the orher hand. useful inforrnation on rhe proportion ofex_
military ot'ficers anrong the political elite ca'be found i'Frank rachau. "The
Anotorny of Political and social cha.ge: Turkish parlies, parliarnents. and
Elections". Comparative Politics, 5 (July 1973), pp. 5-51-573.
29. For an elaborarion, see Karpat, Turkev's Politics the Transition to a Multi-
Party System. and Cem Erolul. Demokrat Parti.
30. For a detailed discussion, scc Ergun Ozbudun. The Role of the Militar-v in Recenl
Turkish Politics. Harward University center for Intenrational Alfairs, occa-
sional Papcrs in I'rcrnarional Aftairs. No.14 (Novenrber 1966). p.21, a'd
Weikcr, The Modernization of Turkey, pp.38-39.
31. After the victory of the opposition pafiy in 1950 and during its adminisftations. the
percentage of depuries of military origin fell sharply. Moreover. five of the six
ministers of inter'al defense during this period were civilians as compared to
their eleve' predecessors, all of whom came from a military background. Ibid.
32. For a detailed analysis of the isolation of Dp. see Karpat, Turkey's politics the
Transition to a Multi-Party System, ch.lO. and Ero[ul, Demokrat parti,
pp.170-175, See, also, Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democ-
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racy, 1950 - 1975 (l,ondon. C. Hursr and Company, 1977), pp.175 - 200.
33. Unconstituiional laws such as Martial Law (Commitee to investigate the activilics
of re RPP and the section of dre press) and Fatlrerland Front (Vatan Ccphcsi -
investigatory commission sct up to inquire the clunges against Rpp) cau not
be propcrly discussed lrere. For a detailed analysis. see Ibid.
3J. See Erogul. Demokrat Parti p. l7:.
35. Kemal Karpat. "Military lnterventiors: Arrny-CiviliaD Rclations in Turkey Bcfo-
re and Aliter 1980", in Metin Hcpcl and Ahmet Evin. eds., State, Democracv
and the Military, p.137.
36. For a detailed analysis of the election resuls, see Karpat, Turkey,s Politics the
Transition lo a Multi Party System, cb.10.
37. Karpat. "Military Intcrventions : Army-Civilian Relations in Turkcy Bclbre and
Aftcr 1980", p.138.
38. For dctailcd analysis of the 19f.1 Constirution, see Suna Kili. Osmanh ve Tiirk
Anayasalarr tlsranbul. Bolazigi Unrversircsi Yayrnlan. l9E0l. pp.ll-55.
39. It is interesting that the 1982 Constitution has sought to streDgrlrcn tllc l\esident irl
just these ways, paving thc way for the hesident's persoual powcr and iuflu-
eDce,
.10. Hcper and Tachau, "The State, Polirics, and the Mililary in Turkey". p.21.
41. The Turkish military is ftequenlly regarded as the guardian of lhe slalc and Kerna-
list principlcs. However, the military titkeover of 1960 was a major devialiot
from the Kemalist principle rhat officers should remain outsidc polidcs as
lon8 as they werc part ofthe anned fotces. It was for this reason lhal ofticers
ircludinB Mustafa Kemal fust resigned from thc military bclbrc taking on ac-
tive rolcs ilr politics. The coup of 1960 signalled a changc in rlis tradition.
42. Karpat. "Military Interventions : AJlny-Civilian Relations in Turkey Bcfore and
After 1980". pp.1,1l- 142.
43. Republic ofTurkey, The Constitution (1961), arrs. 14,2,1, 46-48, 63-66. 120,
121,132, 145-152.
14. Ibid.. arts. 96-97, 105. 108,109, I l3-l1,1, I l6-132. 145. 147.
45. For the detailed information about proportional rcpresentalior system and coaliri-
on cabinets bctween 1960 and 1980. sce Sayan, Parlamenler Demokrasi.
lerd€ Koalisyon Hiikiimetleri. pp.l67-210.
46. For morc deraih, see C.H. Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy. pp.7--ll.
.17. For a detalied discussion on sccond interventiol see Feroz Ahmad The Turkish
Experiment in Democracy. 1950-1975, ch.VII.
48. For more details on the ultimatum. see lbid., pp.288-289.
49. Heper and Tachau, "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey". p.23.
50. Ibid., pp.23-24.
5 1 . A more detailed explanation on the new leadership of the RPP and the new charac-
ter of the RPP, see Ahmad, The Turkish Experim€nt in D€mocracy,
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pp.327-361 and Suna Kili, 1960-1975 Diinemind€ Cumhuriyet lIalk Parti'
sinde GeliSmeler (lstanbul, Bolazigi Universitesi Yayrnr, 1976).
52. Karpat, "Military rnterventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and
Afte! 1980", p.148.
53. For a detailed study of the coalition govemments between 1973- 1980, see sayan,
Parlamenter Demokrasilerde Koalisyon Hiikiimetleri, pp.167-210.
54. The 1973 election showed that seven parties gained seats in the Assembly but only
hve (RPP, JP, National Salvation Pany-NsP, Republican Reliance Party-
RRP, National Action Party - NAP) had the fJotential !o participate in coaliri-
on govemments. Besides, governrnents were fonned the bipolar alignments
of the two major parties on the Centre-Lef( (RPP) and the Centre-Right (JP)
providing the bases for iwo alternative coalition formations (RPPINSP,
JP+NSP+RRP+NAP). After the 1977 election the JP, also. formed a new coa-
lition governnent widr $e NSP arrd thc NAP. For a detailed analysis ofthe
major consequence of increased fragmertalion in the Turkish party system,
see Sayarr, Parlamenler Demokrasilerde Koalisyon Hiikiim€tleri,
pp.I90-20O, and Milliyetr Cumhuriyet, Hiirriye! August 3,4,5, 1977 - Ja-
nuary 7. 8.9, 1978.
55. Ergiider, "Redemocntization ard Elections in Turkey". p.31.
56, Heper and Tachau, "The Statc, Politics, and tlre Military in Turkey". p.25.
57. Ibid.
58, Binnaz Toprak. 'The State. Politics, and Religion in Turkey", in Metin Heper and
Ahmet Evin, eds., Stale, Democracy and the Military. p.15.
59. See Dodd, The Crisis ofTurkish Democracy, p.21.
60. Fo! detailed alalysis of ecooomic conditions berween 1970- 1980. see Yakup Ke-
penek Tiirkiye Ekonomisi (Ar*ara. ODTU yayrm. 1983). Mustafa Siinmez,
Tiirkiye Ekonomisinde BunaLm (lstanbul. Belge Yaylnlan. 1982), Secto-
ral Statistics liom tbe State Planning Organization (SPO). Aonual Program
(1965-1983) and Trends and Prospects in Turkish Labor Force (1982),
61. Compiled from Birol Ali Yegilada. "Breakdown of Democracy in Turkey", Un-
published Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Michigan, 1984, pp.l96-197.
6?. In 1983 the military rule ended nad yet another fransition to democracy started
with a completely new set of leadcrs and frolitical panies. On the other hand,
all bans on the former political parties leaders were ended after the referan-
dum in 1985. For a detailed discussion on this subject see lltex Turan, "Poliri-
cal Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 Twkey" in Metin Heper and Ah-
met Evin, eds., State, Democracy and lhe Military. pp. 66-84, and Ustiin
Ergtide!, "Post-1980 Parties and Politics in Turkey" in Ergun Ozbudun, ed.
P€rsp€ctiv€s otr Democracy in Turkey. (Ankara, Turkish Political Science
Association, 1988). pp.l29-l 32.
63. Heper and Tachau, "The State, Polilics, and the Military h Turkey", p.28.
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64. Helsinki Watch Commiftee, Human Rights in Turkeyrs Transitions to Democ.
racy, New York Helsinki Watch, 1982, pp.79-90; The New York Times,
July 10, 1982. C.H. Dod4 The Crisis of Democracy in Turkey, pp.54-59.
65. William Hale, "Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey" in Metin Heper
and Ahmet Evin, eds., State, Democracy and the Military, pp.160-162.
66. In the case of the cisis which led to the intervention of 12 March 1971. we know
that such considerations were important to lhe high command. As General
Muhsin Batur. then the Air Force Commarder, tells us. a group of officers had
earlier approached him with a plan for the irnposition ofan outlight military
regimc. which they wished him to lead. General Batur tumed lhe idea down:
" The Westem World cannot accept this sort of systcm aod proccdure. Iis just not good
enough io say 'if they don't accept it, then so be it'. [f we give way (i.e., adopt
the proposed plan) we'll get support from dre Eastem Block and Red China,
but that would be a disaster for Turkey".
Muhsin Batur, "Son 3O Yrhn Olayr: Muhsin Batur'un An an". Parl 10, Milliyet, 12
May 1985.
67. Hanis. "The Rolc of the Military iD Turkey in the 1980s", p.194.
68. Ibid.
69. Republic of Turkey. Consiitution of the R€public (1982), afls.104.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. For the detailed on tle scope of the p,rcsidential powers and classfication of list of
srlch powers as pcrtaining to legislative, executive. andjudicial function, see
Ergun Ozbudun, '-Ihe State of the Prcsident of the Republic under the Turkish
Constitution of 1982" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds.. State, Democ-
racy and the Military, pp.39-40.
73. Republic of Turkey. Constitution of lhe Republic ( 1982), arl 105.
74. lbid.. a!t. 28.
75. Helsinki Watch Committee, Human Rights, p.71.
76. The right lo strike is also controlled by the state. The law lists a numbc of occupati-
onal areas where strikes are pnohibitcd. These areas are: the rescue services,
including life and goprty funeral services; water, electriciry, gas, coal, natu-
ral gas, oil cxploratiol, extraction, refining and distribution services, public
sector fire-figl' ing. slreet cleaning, garbage removal and transpon (land, sea,
and air) services, vaccine and serum producers, hospitals, clinics, sanatod-
ums, dispensaries, chemists shops and other places related to healfi services;
hstitutions of education and child care, home for the elderly, cemetades;
workplaces operatid by the Ministry of Defense, the High Command of the
Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard. Merip Reporls, no 12l (February, 1984),
p.20. Accordingly, a hade union must announce a strike plan at least six days
in advance. [f the strike is pennitled by the state, tlte union is held rcsponsible
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for any darnage to machinery or the workplace sustained during the strike.
77. Republic of Turkey, Constitution of the Republic (1982), art. 52, par. 1.
78. Ibid., art. 33. par.3.
79. Ibid., art. 3.1, par.4.
80. Ibid.. art. 1 18.
81. Ibid., art. 130-132.
82. Ibid.. art. 124.
li3. Hrfzr V. Velidcdcogll. "Atattirk'i.in Vasiyeti BozuLnaz", Cumhuriyet (lstarrbul).
16 January 1983.
84. There is no nced here to go into detail. As noted before, all political partics were
outlawed. following the coup of Septernber 1980. Moreover, the leadcrs of
these parties tbr a priod of five to ten years. Thus. when tlre generals dccided
to reinstatc parliarnentary politics beginning with thc Novernber 6, 1983 nati-
onal elcctions they called for thc lbrrnation of new political parties. However,
the formation of the new plitical parties was to be hcavily controlled process
under close watch by thc NSC. This process of parfy formation was to lbllow
spccilic guidclincs.
First. thc new parties werc requircd not to have ties to tl're pre-1980 political parties and
had to be forrncd by at least thirty lbunding rnembrs. Second, thc NSC would
evaluate cach party's by laws, the list of tbunding mernbers and vcto those in-
dividuals lbund unfit for political rolcs. Third, the parties that reccived vctoes
would thcn appoint new tbunding rncurbers aud subrnit their lists back to the
NSC. Finally, this process would continue until the rarification of the parry's
list by thc NSC. Following tnc NSC dccision ro allow political cornptirion ro
re-open in May 1983. sevcral parties emerged hoping to run for otlce in No-
vernbcr,
For a detailed analysis of the new political parties. see llter Turan. "Political Parties
and the Parry Systern in Post - 1983 Turkey", in Metin Heper and Ahrler Evin,
eds., State, Democracy and the Military. pp.63-17; Usti.in Ergiidcr, "Post-
1980 parties and Politics in Turkey". Perspective On Democrac-v in Turkey
(Ankara. Turkish Political Scicnce Association, 1988). ch.3. pp.l 15-l-15. and
Frank Tachau. "Political leadcrship in Turkey: Continuity and Changc", in
Metin Hcper and Ahmet Evin. eds.. State, Democracy and the Militar_v.
pp.l03-l 14.
85. See Lucille W. Pevsner, Turkev's Political Crisis (New York, Praeger Publis-
hers, 1984), pp. 95-96 and Christian Rurnpt, "The Military. The Presidency,
and the Constitution: A Comparative Approach to the Weimer Republic,
France 1958, and Turkey 1982", in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin. eds.. State.
Democracy and the Military. pp.2l6-238.
86. The NSC selected 160 Consultative Assembly members from a list of l0 thousand
names, drawn up with fte aid of provincial governors and excluding all politi-
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cal cadres. A set of provisional articles appended to the constitution was nol
open to public debate. Furtherrnore, remarks by General Evren and kime Mi_
nister Bi.ilent Ulusu had also made it clear that rejection of the constitutio'
would rcsult i'continuation of military rule. New york rimes. November g,
1982; t'inanciar'l'imes (London), Jury 27, l9g2; Turkish Dairy News. No-
vcrnber l-7.1982.
87. Ergtider, "Redemocratization and Elections in Turkey", p.3
88. Sorne set of hypotheses relates rnilitary intervention to weaknesses i, civilian po-
litical instirutions. For nrore detail. see Samuel Huntington. political order
in changing S<rieties (New Haven, yare univenity kess. r96g) and sarnu-
el E. Finer. The Man on Horseback (New york, praeger, 1962).
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